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I.

INTRODUCTION

International Environmental Law and the Global South provides a
comprehensive and critical assessment of the role of international law in
perpetuating the interrelated issues of poverty, ecological destruction, and
overconsumption.1 A crucial component of these destructive patterns is
resource extraction, which is required for the wheels of production to turn. In
my chapter in International Environmental Law in the Global South,
Transnational Corporations and Extractive Industries, I examined this
dimension with a focus on mineral extraction and suggest that from the
perspective of local communities of the Global South, there are common
problems irrespective of the material being extracted.2 In this Article, I revisit

*

Professor Sara L. Seck, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor at Western Law in Ontario, Canada.
Professor Seck would like to thank the student editors of Transnational Law and Contemporary
Problems for their editorial support and for hosting the Symposium on International
Environmental Law and the Global South. Further, Seck is grateful to Carmen Gonzalez for her
invaluable comments on the first draft of this Article and to Western Law J.D. student Jessica
Buckerfield for her excellent assistance with research. Seck notes that this contribution would not
have been possible without Karen Knop and Jennifer Nedelsky whose profoundly influential
writings on relational theory in domestic and international law were introduced to Seck as a
student at the University of Toronto’s Faculty of Law in the late 1990s.
See INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH (Shawkat Alam, Sumudu
Atapattu, Carmen G. Gonzalez, & Jona Razzaque eds., 2015).
1

Sara L. Seck, Transnational Corporations and Extractive Industries, in INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH, supra note 1, at 380.
2
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this assumption considering the added complexity of fossil fuel extraction as a
key contributor to climate change and its disproportionate impacts on women
of the Global South. Several chapters in International Environmental Law and
the Global South consider various dimensions of climate change including the
role of powerful southern States in shaping climate mitigation,3 the absence of
international legal remedy for climate-vulnerable small island, developing
States, 4 and the relationship between climate disaster policy and responsibility
for loss and damage.5 Other chapters discuss the ground-breaking Inuit
Climate Change Petition and present an indigenous perspective on the climate
regime,6 energy justice, and black carbon’s impact on both climate change and
women’s health.7 Yet, these chapters fail to explicitly consider the
contributions of resource extraction companies to the climate problem.
Similarly, no attention is given to the gendered nature of climate change
harms. In this Article, I argue that preventing and remedying climate change
harms necessitate a re-imagining of fundamental international law
assumptions that currently inhibit the search for climate justice. This task will
be undertaken with reference to insights found in an Article written by
Professor Karen Knop and published in this journal in 1993, entitled
Re/Statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty in International Law.8
I previously examined the need to rethink fundamental concepts of
international law in an article from 2008, which queried how third world
approaches to international law might help reimagine principles to overcome
the reluctance of home States to regulate transnational corporate conduct and
prevent and remedy human rights violations.9 A companion paper considered
See Rowena Maguire & Xiaoyi Jiang, Emerging Powerful Southern Voices: Role of BASIC Nations
in Shaping Climate Change Mitigation Commitments, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH, supra note 1, at 214.
3

See Maxine Burkett, A Justice Paradox: Climate Change, Small Island Developing States, and
the Absence of International Legal Remedy, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE
GLOBAL SOUTH, supra note 1, at 435.
4

See Paul J. Govind & Robert R. M. Verchick, Natural Disaster and Climate Change, in
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH, supra note 1, at 491, 501–04; see
also Koh Kheng-Lian & Nicholas A. Robinson, South-South Cooperation: Foundations for
Sustainable Development, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH,
supra note 1, at 553, 561–62.
5

See Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, South of South: Examining the International Climate Regime
from an Indigenous Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH,
supra note 1, at 451, 460–63; see also SHEILA WATT-CLOUTIER, THE RIGHT TO BE COLD: ONE
WOMAN’S STORY OF PROTECTING HER CULTURE, THE ARCTIC, AND THE WHOLE PLANET (2015).
6

See Lakshman Guruswamy, The Contours of Energy Justice, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH, supra note 1, at 529, 535.
7

Karen Knop, Re/Statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty in International Law, 3
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293 (1993).
8

See Sara L. Seck, Unilateral Home State Regulation: Imperialism or Tool for Subaltern
Resistance?, 46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 565 (2008); see also Penelope C. Simons, International Law’s
Invisible Hand and the Future of Corporate Accountability for Violations of Human Rights, 3 J.
9
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these issues with specific reference to environmental justice in the global
mining context.10 Both papers informed my contribution to International
Environmental Law and the Global South on extractive industries; yet, my
chapter failed to examine either the climate justice dimensions of fossil fuel
industries or the implications of extractive industries for women. Moreover,
while my proposal to reimagine core principles of international law in the 2008
article integrated a feminist analysis of international law, it did so only briefly
and with no reference to the additional complexities of climate justice.
This Article explicitly examines the relationship between climate
justice, gender, and transnational fossil fuel extractive industries by drawing
upon feminist theoretical insights. First, I provide an overview of the
differential impacts of climate change on women and briefly review insights
from select international legal scholars who have considered gender and
climate change. Second, I describe the Philippines climate Petition, a novel
attempt to seek an investigation into the accountability of transnational fossil
fuel companies for climate harms. Third, I examine three sets of issues arising
in the Philippines climate Petition and drawing explicitly upon Karen Knop’s
Re/Statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty in International Law. Here, I
consider how feminist approaches to international legal theory might enrich
the analysis of legal doctrines fundamental to framing the issues and outcome
of the Philippines Petition. Specifically, I consider three different sets of claims
that emerge from a critique of the bounded, autonomous, and unified liberal
subject that informs implicit understandings of state and sovereignty at
international law. In conclusion, I argue that climate justice demands we take
up a relational view of the state, dissolve boundaries between public and
private sectors, and embrace visions of overlapping sovereignties.
II.

GENDER, CLIMATE JUSTICE AND VULNERABILITY

While not long ago climate change was understood exclusively as an
environmental issue, it is now well established that climate change threatens
the enjoyment of human rights.11 Indeed, climate change has been described
by Mary Robinson, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Climate Change,
as “the greatest threat to human rights in the twenty-first century.”12 In
Human Rights Approaches to Climate Change: Challenges and Opportunities,
HUM. RTS. & ENV’T 5, 5 (2012); Sara L. Seck, Home State Obligations for the Prevention and
Remediation of Transnational Harm: Canada, Global Mining and Local Communities (Dec. 2007)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, York University) (on file with SSRN).
See Sara L. Seck, Transnational Business and Environmental Harm: A TWAIL Analysis of Home
State Obligations, 3 TRADE L. & DEV. 164 (2011).
10

UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2015),
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climate-change/climate_change_and_h
uman_rights.pdf.
11

U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights
obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, ¶ 23,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/52 (Feb. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Report of the Special Rapporteur].
12
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Professor Sumudu Atapattu explores the differential impacts of climate change
on women.13 Atapattu highlights the vulnerability of women in developing
countries who are “highly dependent on local natural resources for their
livelihoods” and face “unequal access to resources and decision-making
processes.”14 This vulnerability and exclusion arises from “cultural norms,
social marginalization and sometimes religious beliefs” and applies “equally to
rural women in many parts of the world.”15 International human rights law
guarantees gender equality and prohibits gender discrimination,16 and various
theoretical approaches provide further insights into the “nexus between gender
and environment.”17 In the climate context, however, Atapattu noted that,
unlike the recognition of women and environment in Principle 20 of the 1992
Rio Declaration, the UNFCCC, which was adopted in the same year, is silent
on gender.18 This is curious given that both the 1992 U.N. Convention on
Biological Diversity and the 1994 U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification
affirm the importance of female participation in both policy-making and
implementation.19
The first climate instrument to refer to gender was the 2007 Bali Action
Plan20 when a “global network of organizations emerged on gender issues.”
This led to an “official Women and Gender Constituency” formed under the
UNFCCC in 2011.21 In 2014, a Work Program on Gender was launched in
Lima.22 The Preamble of the 2015 Paris Agreement includes an explicit
reference to gender among a long list of considerations:

SUMUDU ATAPATTU, HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO CLIMATE CHANGE: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES 198–217 (2016).
13

14

Id. at 199.

15

Id. at 199–200.

See e.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 26, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women art. 1, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force
Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW], noted in ATAPATTU, supra note 13, at 201.
16

ATAPATTU, supra note 13, at 202. These approaches include an “ecofeminist approach,” a “women
in development” approach, and a “gender and development” approach (GAD), with gender
mainstreaming as a strategy for implementation that aligns with GAD. Id.
17

See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107
(entered into force Mar. 21, 1994) [hereinafter UNFCCC], noted in ATAPATTU, supra note 13, at
202–03.
18

See Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 (entered into force Dec.
29, 1993); United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing
Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, Oct. 14 1994, 1954 U.N.T.S. 3
(opened for signature Dec. 26, 1996), noted in ATAPATTU, supra note 13, at 203.
19

20

ATAPATTU, supra note 13, at 202–03.

21

Id. at 203–04.

22

Id. at 205.
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Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of
humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address
climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective
obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of
indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children,
persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations
and the right to development, as well as gender equality,
empowerment of women and intergenerational equity.23
Atapattu noted that when the CEDAW Committee observed the failure to
integrate a gender perspective into the UNFCCC regime, it highlighted the
multiple types of discrimination facing women who are the “main producers of
world’s staple crops.”24 “[R]ural women, minority women, indigenous women
and those with disabilities” face additional hurdles.25 Nevertheless, women
should not be portrayed as victims of climate change, but rather, portrayed as
“powerful agents of change” whose “leadership” is crucial to bring about
reform.26
The problem with the insufficient representation of women in U.N. climate
negotiations was documented in a statistical analysis of negotiations between
1995 and 2011, which established that, even though gender representation
over time and across delegations has improved, it is not equal and varies
widely.27 The view that women, and especially poor women, are both
particularly vulnerable to climate impacts and knowledgeable of natural
resource management and coping strategies in disaster contexts has become
widespread.28
The importance of a gender perspective on climate justice has been central
to the work of the Mary Robinson Foundation – Climate Justice (“the
Foundation”).29 The Foundation’s mission is to “put justice and equity at the
heart of responses to climate change” by empowering poor and marginalized

Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/REV.1 (Dec. 12, 2015).
23

24

ATAPATTU, supra note 13, at 206.

25

Id.

26

Id.

Johannes Kruse, Women’s representation in the UN Climate Change Negotiations: A
Quantitative Analysis of State Delegations, 1995-2011, 14 INT’L E NVTL. AGREEMENTS 349 passim
(2014).
27

ATAPATTU, supra note 13, at 208–16; see also Petra Tschakert & Mario Machado, Gender Justice
and Rights in Climate Change Adaptation: Opportunities and Pitfalls, 6 ETHICS & SOC. WELFARE
275 (2012).
28

See Women’s Leadership on Gender and Climate Change, MARY ROBINSON FOUND. CLIMATE
JUSTICE,
http://www.mrfcj.org/our-work/areas-of-work/womens-leadership-on-gender-andclimate-change/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2017).
29
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communities that are most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.30
Several principles guide the work of the Foundation, beginning with the need
to protect and respect human rights.31 Other principles include the need to
support the right to development, to allocate “benefits and burdens” equitably,
to ensure climate change decision-making is participatory and transparent,
and to address gender equality and equity.32 These principles align with the
recently endorsed Sustainable Development Goals.33 For example, Sustainable
Development Goal Thirteen addresses climate action, while Goal Five is to
“[a]chieve gender equality and to empower all women and girls,” and includes
as a target the “full and effective participation and equal opportunities for
leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public
life.”34
While the discussion of gender and climate justice generally focuses on
women in states of the Global South, some scholars and activists have
considered gender dimensions more broadly.35 For example, as elderly women
from the Global North are also considered vulnerable, the “Swiss Grannies”
have recently taken climate action against their government on this basis,
together with the claim that their role as grandmothers is to ensure the future
quality of life for their grandchildren.36 Geographer Margaret Skutsch
canvasses the importance of considering gender in three areas: responsibility
for emissions, vulnerability to climate change, and participation in climatechange-related fund activities.37 Nancy Wonders and Mona Danner approach

Mission
and
Vision,
MARY
ROBINSON
FOUND.
–
CLIMATE
http://www.mrfcj.org/about/mission-and-vision (last visited Mar. 20, 2017).
30

JUSTICE,

See Principles of Climate Justice, MARY ROBINSON FOUND. – CLIMATE JUSTICE,
http://www.mrfcj.org/principles-of-climate-justice (last visited Feb. 20, 2017).
31

32

Id.

See Sustainable Development Goals, U.N.: SUSTAINABLE DEV. KNOWLEDGE PLATFORM,
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals (last visited Mar. 20,
2017).
33

Sustainable Development Goals, Goal 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all girls, U.N.:
SUSTAINABLE DEV. KNOWLEDGE, http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/gender-equality/
(last visited Mar. 20, 2017).
34

See, e.g., Nathalie J. Chalifour, A Feminist Perspective on Carbon Taxes, 22 CAN. J. WOMEN & L.
169 (2010); Annie Rochette, Climate Change is a Social Justice Issue: The Need for a Gender-Based
Analysis of Mitigation and Adaptation Policies in Canada and Quebec, 29 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC.
383 (2016).
35

See Press Release, Greenpeace Int’l, Swiss Grannies Launch Legal Challenge to Demand
Stronger
Climate
Action
(Oct.
25,
2016),
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/press/releases/2016/Swiss-Grannies-launch-legalchallenge-to-demand-stronger-climate-action.
36

Margaret M. Skutsch, Protocols, Treaties and Action: the ‘Climate Change Process’ Viewed
Through Gender Spectacles, 10 GENDER & DEV. 30, 30–35 (2002). The importance of approaching
climate change with an intersectional perspective in order to both (a) understand climate change
more fully and (b) to come up with “more effective and legitimate climate strategies” has more
37
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climate change from a feminist criminological perspective, discussing how the
social construction of “masculinities” and “femininities” directly contributes to
climate change.38 They propose that criminological approaches can tackle the
gender-climate change link by focusing on “state-corporate crime” and shifting
responsibility for climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts towards
those who cause the most harm. This can also be accomplished by developing
the international crime of “ecocide” and through a “right to regenerate” that
frames climate change as a human security issue.39 Wonders and Danner also
highlight the important role of teachers and scholars in effectuating the change
necessary to confront the challenges of climate change.40
However, scholars like Noël Sturgeon suggest that academics should be
cautious of essentialist rhetoric common among ecofeminists that portrays
women as “natural environmentalists” and indigenous women as even closer
to nature.41 Sturgeon views essentialist rhetoric as useful for activist purposes
where it may unite subordinate groups, allow disempowered individuals to
access new political arenas, and have a voice in the creation of international
policies.42 Yet, Sturgeon also highlights the concern that these discourses tend
to shift responsibility for environmental solutions to indigenous women in
particular, rather than emphasizing the need for the Western world to take
responsibility for the environmental consequences of its consumption
patterns.43 One of the concerns raised is that collapsing many different women
(such as Native American women, Third World women, and romanticized
notions of pre-Christian European pagan women) into the category of
“indigenous” women actually reinforces the racist discourse it seeks to
challenge.44 Despite the limits of essentialist discourses, Sturgeon suggests
recently been raised by Anna Kaijser and Annica Kronsell. See Anna Kaijser & Annica
Kronsell, Climate Change Through the Lens of Intersectionality, 23 ENVTL. POL. 417, 473 (2014).
Nancy A. Wonders & Mona J. E. Danner, Gendering Climate Change: A Feminist Criminological
Perspective, 23 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 401, 401–03 (2015).
38

Id. at 409–13 (citing NAOMI KLEIN, THIS CHANGES EVERYTHING: CAPITALISM VS. THE CLIMATE
(2014)).
39

40

Id. at 412–15.

See, e.g., Noël Sturgeon, Ecofeminist Appropriations and Transnational Environmentalisms, 6
IDENTITIES 255 (1999). She defines ecofeminism as “a political position based on an analysis of the
consequences of Western, patriarchal society’s devaluation of nature and of women” involving
agreement over the negative consequences of “the patriarchal Western conception of nature as a
feminized, exploitable resource” and the disproportionate burdens environmental degradation
places on women. Id. at 261–62. Sturgeon traces this trend, in part, to the work of Vandana Shiva
who considered Western notions of development as involving the “death of the feminine principle”
(i.e., balance and harmony with nature premised on the notion of gender complementarity) and
the subordination to and separation between women and nature versus men and development. Id.
at 260.
41

42

Id. at 257.

43

Id. at 263.

44

Sturgeon, supra note 41, at 263.
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such discourses serve a number of purposes, including the identification of
Third World women as experts, successfully allowing related political
movements to access the international spheres, and introducing feminist
concerns as a part of the “hegemonic discourse of globalizing
environmentalisms.”45
Sturgeon is not alone in being cautious of essentialism. Martha Fineman’s
theory of vulnerability attempts to “problematiz[e] the core assumptions
underlying the ‘autonomous’ subject of liberal law and politics.”46 Instead, she
puts forward a theory based on “the commonalities of the human condition . . .
the universal vulnerability of human beings and the imperfection of the
societal institutions created to address that vulnerability.”47 Fineman’s
“vulnerability theory” was developed to focus more on the “humans” than the
“rights” of prevailing approaches to human rights discourse48 and calls for a
“responsive state” that helps to produce “resilience” among individuals in
society, who are all understood to be vulnerable: “Vulnerability is posited as a
fundamental characteristic that positions individuals in relation to each other
as human beings and also suggests an appropriate relationship of shared
responsibility as between State, societal institutions, and individuals.”49 The
theory is intended to expose inequalities in the degree of vulnerability
experienced by individuals and the availability of resources to produce
resilience across the population: “[T]he central ethical impulse animating
vulnerability theory [is] the question of embodied life and its ethical
implications in lived situations in which highly selective forms of vulnerability
. . . are deployed (sometimes imposed) to disguise their structural
production.”50
Anna Grear takes Fineman’s analysis further, seeing the potential for
vulnerability to increase “juridical responsiveness” in a number of issues facing
the world.51 She emphasizes the utility of vulnerability theory as an approach
Id. at 266. Additionally, the inherent tension in ecofeminist discourses, due to its feminist/antiracist aims and, despite this, its tendency to essentialize “Indigenous” women, creates an
opportunity to debate essentialist discourses. Further, essentialist discourses “create two-way
streets” between Third World and Western feminists. Id. at 257.
45

Martha A. Fineman & Anna Grear, Introduction: Vulnerability as Heuristic—An Invitation to
Future Exploration, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW
AND POLITICS 1, 1 (Martha A. Fineman & Anna Grear eds., 2013).
46

47

Id.

Id. at 2 (stating “a focus on vulnerability is decidedly focused on exploring the nature of the
human part, rather than the rights part, of the human rights trope”).
48

49

Id.

50

Id. at 11.

Anna Grear, Vulnerability, Advanced Global Capitalism and Co-symptomatic Injustice: Locating
the Vulnerable Subject, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW
AND POLITICS, supra note 46, at 41–60 (seeking to examine vulnerability theory in the context of
“bio-material embodiment” and the “materialities of advanced global capitalism.”).
51
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that seeks to “directly . . . address the inadequacy and distortion produced by
the dominant assumptions of the existing liberal legal and political order.”52
These dominant assumptions portray the law as neutral, with its “mythic,”
“rational,” “disembodied” actors operating on a level playing field.53 Grear
draws attention to what she terms “the ‘double-excisions’ of the liberal judicial
ethos.”54 She suggests the current liberal order encourages an excision of
bodies and socio-material context to serve “highly particular interests,” an
approach which merged “with other impulses to produce an identifiable form
of ideological hegemony which has in turn produced . . . [a] coupling between
the imperatives of neoliberal capitalism and law in the contemporary
globalised context.”55 Vulnerability, in its emphasis on both embodiment and
context, is thus offered as a solution to “the ways in which the legal order
performs its ‘rationalising’ function in the production of capitalistic privilege
and disadvantage.”56 After recounting the historical development of the
“capitalist liberal subject” through “[the rise of] a particular form of
disembodied rationalism within liberal law, the ascendency of methodological
individualism and . . . the rational, autonomous (male) individual of liberal
legalism and capitalist economic theory,” Grear suggests law similarly excises
embodiment and context in furtherance of power.57 She writes: “[t]here is a red
thread of continuity discernible between capitalism and law’s disciplinary
control of the body, the body’s selective excision, ‘legitimated’ violence against
embodied beings and the body’s analogical reproduction in the privileged
corporate form.”58 She suggests the corporate form has been elevated above the
individual through upholding corporate “embodiment,” “a form of idiosyncratic
embodiment reflecting disembodied characteristics that no human body can
ultimately hope to replicate or benefit from.”59
Karen Knop also confronts the problematic assumptions associated with
the autonomous liberal subject in her 1993 Re/Statements article, yet does so
to encourage consciousness about common assumptions about state
sovereignty that permeate “the functional and allegorical parameters of
international law.”60 The details of her analysis for the more abstract question
of what implications flow from feminist theory for “alternative conceptions of

52

Id. at 42.

53

Id. at 44.

54

Id. at 34.

55

Id. at 43.

56

Grear, supra note 51, at 45 (citation omitted).

57

Id.

58

Id.

Id. at 44–45. It is beyond the scope of this Article to examine Grear’s provocative analysis
further.
59

60

Knop, supra note 8, at 296.
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sovereignty” will be revealed later61 and applied to a particular example of
climate change litigation. It is worth noting here that her article begins by
exploring shifting understandings of statism in international law and its
implications for the inclusiveness of women’s voices in international law. By
statism, Knop means proposals to “condition the international status of the
state on its respect for human rights,” including “respect for the right of
participation in democratic governance,” which feminists would claim should
be interpreted so as to afford women truly “equal representation in
government.”62 She suggests that feminist jurisprudence offers three different
responses to arguments that “formal equality is sufficient to ensure adequate
representation of women.”63 An equality response suggests that women are
effectively excluded even if not overtly discriminated against, as male norms
are adopted to judge the eligibility of those who are privileged to participate in
international law making.64 A difference response suggests, “male voices can
never speak for female voices” as “men’s experiences, interests, and ways of
reasoning are so different from those of women.”65 Finally, a collectiveautonomy response suggests that “women should be able to decide at least
certain international issues not because they will decide them better than, or
even differently from, men, but because they as a group . . . should be able to
make the decisions that affect their lives.”66
However, Knop then queries the centrality of the State to international
law, positing that it “might be important for women to reject—or, at least, not
to assume—the centrality of the State” due to the fact that “women’s interests
and concerns are not defined exclusively, or in many cases even significantly,
by State borders.”67 Treating the State as the primary actor in international
law means that women’s voices can only be heard through the State, and that
women from different States who wish to work together must rely upon the
formation of alliances “between their respective States.”68 International legal
theorists have differed in their approach, with some arguing non-governmental
women’s groups that contribute directly to the formation of customary
international law should be recognized, independent of state consent, because

61

See discussion infra Section (3).

62

Knop, supra note 8, at 298.

63

Id. at 303.

64

Id. at 304–05.

65

Id. at 305–06.

66

Id. at 306–07.

Knop, supra note 8, at 308 (explaining instead that “they are shaped by gender, sexuality,
culture, and other factors”).
67

68

Id. at 309.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3284871

Summer 2017]

CLIMATE JUSTICE, FEMINISM, AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY

11

non-state actor cooperation or “action in concert” deserves equal recognition to
cooperative or conflictual behavior of states.69
Increasing recognition of the power of non-state actors in the formation of
customary international law may, according to Knop, be explained in one of
three ways. First, States may have directly or indirectly consented to the
participation of certain NGOs.70 Second, described as an “internal critique of
consent,” if an “NGO wields sufficient power [then] its actions should count
toward the formation of customary international law.”71 Third, in an “external
critique,” Knop observes that a “more radical critique of participation in the
creation of international law” is necessary to question both the “idea of
consent” and the “underlying distribution of power” and to “justify giving a
voice to women’s NGOs which may lack even the possibility to organize on a
wide scale and act globally, due to oppressive or discriminatory regimes or
insufficient resources [sic].”72
Knop also observes that there is a “dark side of unregulated international
civil society [which] is its tendency to replicate the imbalance of political and
economic power that characterizes the system of States” as well as the
importance of acknowledging that not all non-State actors are “seeking to hold
States morally accountable;” notably, there are also “powerful multinational
corporations motivated by economic self-interest.”73
This section has highlighted that while women of the Global South in
particular face climate vulnerability, and there is a pressing need to
incorporate their voices into international climate change law, this is not the
complete story. Knop’s preliminary analysis, combined with Fineman and
Grear’s vulnerability insights, suggests that there are larger questions to ask
about the nature of international legal analysis that go beyond focusing on the
participation of women in the negotiation of the international climate change
regime. These fundamental structural questions will be considered later,

See id. at 311–13 (drawing heavily upon the work of Isabelle Gunning); see also Isabelle R.
Gunning, Modernizing Customary International Law: The Challenge of Human Rights, 31 VA. J.
INT’L L. 211, 211–14 (1991).
69

70

Knop, supra note 8, at 314.

Id. (explaining that if power in international relations is distributed differently than before, then
“States may no longer be the only entities whose consent is fundamental to international law”).
71

Id. at 315–16 (drawing upon Shelley Wright). See generally Shelley Wright, Economic Rights,
Social Justice and the State: A Feminist Reappraisal, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 117 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993) [hereinafter RECONCEIVING REALITY].
72

Knop, supra note 8, at 317–18 (noting that “Karen Engle reminds us that ‘some, particularly
some who have a lot of power, see being outside the grip of public international law as positive and
liberating’”); Karen Engle, After the Collapse of the Public/Private Distinction: Strategizing
Women’s Rights, in RECONCEIVING REALITY, supra note 72, at 10.
73
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including the responsibilities of powerful transnational corporations in
international law.74
III.

THE PHILIPPINES CLIMATE PETITION

The Petition to the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines
Requesting for Investigation of the Responsibility of the Carbon Majors for
Human Rights Violations or Threats of Violations Resulting from the Impacts
of Climate Change (“Philippines Climate Petition”)75 was submitted to the
Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines in September 2015 on behalf
of Greenpeace Southeast Asia and the Philippine Rural Reconstruction
Movement.76 It describes the impacts of climate change on the enjoyment of
human rights by Filipinos, and, in a separate Annex, provides an overview of
existing research on the climate change vulnerabilities and impacts in the
Philippines.77 The petitioners highlight the contribution of human-induced
climate change to extreme weather events such as the super-typhoon Yolanda,
which killed “more than 6,000” Filipinos and affected millions more.78 “As an
archipelagic nation, the Philippines is under severe threat of climate change”
due to the extreme vulnerability of its “inhabitants, nature, and
infrastructure” to “weather extremes (e.g., tropical cyclones) and other natural
hazards” including the “increased storm intensity” of typhoons.79 While the
Petition does not differentiate climate impacts on a gender basis, there is
ample evidence that women in the Philippines are disproportionately affected
and their needs must be differentially addressed.80 Indeed, this was a subject

74

See discussion infra Section (2).

GREENPEACE PHILIPPINES, PETITION TO THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE PHILIPPINES
REQUESTING FOR INVESTIGATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CARBON MAJORS FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS OR THREATS OF VIOLATIONS RESULTING FROM THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.greenpeace.org/seasia/ph/PageFiles/105904/ClimateChange-and-Human-Rights-Complaint.pdf [hereinafter Philippines Climate Petition].
75

Id. at 1. The submitters of the Petition include “12 organizations, 20 individuals, and 1,288
Filipinos who expressed support for the petition through a webpage . . . dedicated for this purpose.”
Id.
76

Id. For a summary of literature on the impact of climate change on the Philippines, see Annex
F to the Petition. GREENPEACE PHILIPPINES, ANNEX F: PAST RESEARCH ON VULNERABILITIES AND
AN OVERVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE ON CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE PHILIPPINES (Sept.
22, 2015), https://secured-static.greenpeace.org/seasia/ph/PageFiles/735232/Annex%20F%20%20Past%20Research%20on%20Vulnerabilities%20and%20an%20Overview%20of%20Existing%
20Literature%20on%20Climate%20Change%20Impacts%20in%20the%20Philippines.pdf.
77

78

Philippines Climate Petition, supra note 75, at 2.

79

Id. at 15.

On the importance of a gender-sensitive response to a super-typhoon in the Philippines, see
INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE, SUB-WORKING GROUP ON GENDER AND HUMANITARIAN
ACTION, PHILIPPINES SUPER TYPHOON HAIYAN RESPONSE: GENDER ALERT 1 (Nov. 18, 2013),
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/Gender%20Alert%20Philipp
ines%20November%202013%20IASC%20Gender%20SWG%2011%2018%202013_0.pdf.
80
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of a study in 2008 by the Philippine Commission on Women.81 The Philippines
is now credited with initiating a “ground-breaking” United Nations resolution
on human rights, gender, and climate change in 2011.82
The Philippines Climate Petition is an attempt to seek climate justice and
accountability from non-State actors identified in a study by Mr. Richard
Heede as the “Carbon Majors.”83 The “Carbon Majors” are described as the
“multinational and state-owned producers of crude oil, natural gas, coal, and
cement,” to whom Heede has traced the “lion’s share of cumulative global CO2
and methane emissions since the industrial revolution.”84 For the purpose of
the Philippines Climate Petition, the petitioners decided to focus their efforts
on the “investor-owned” Carbon Majors—that is, those that are publicly
traded—and “some of which have operations or a presence in, or a substantial
connection to the Philippines.”85 The essence of these claim is that fifty
identified investor-owned Carbon Majors contributed nearly “21.72% of
estimated global industrial emissions through 2010;”86 the “level of
responsibility” for each individual producer could be determined by
“indentifying [sic] the company’s share in the estimated global industrial
emissions of carbon.”87 In addition, consideration could be given to when a
company has “allegedly acquired knowledge of its product’s harmful effects,
including the impacts on the climate, ecological balance, and people’s health,
or was informed of those impacts.”88 The petitioners then requested that the
Commission on Human Rights “[c]onduct an investigation into the human
See Climate Change, PHILIPPINE COMM’N ON WOMEN,
areas/environment/climate-change [hereinafter PCW, Climate Change].
81

http://pcw.gov.ph/focus-

Economic and Social Council Res. 2011/6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/2011/L.1, at 1 (Mar. 1, 2011)
(referencing “the need to ensure women’s full enjoyment of all human rights and their effective
participation in environmental decision-making at all levels . . . .”). It was “adopted in consensus
by the Commission’s Member States” that led the charge for the United Nations ECOSOC to take
seriously the gender dimensions of climate change. PCW, Climate Change, supra note 81.
82

RICHARD HEEDE, CLIMATE MITIGATION SERVICES, CARBON MAJORS: ACCOUNTING FOR CARBON
AND METHANE EMISSIONS 1854–2010: METHODS AND RESULTS REPORT 5 (Apr. 7, 2014),
http://climateaccountability.org/pdf/MRR%209.1%20Apr14R.pdf [hereinafter ACCOUNTING FOR
CARBON MAJORS]; see also Richard Heede, Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane
Emissions to Fossil Fuel and Cement Producers, 1854–2010, 122 CLIMATIC CHANGE 229, 229–41
83

(2014), http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10584-013-0986-y.
84

Id. at 5.

Philippines Climate Petition, supra note 75, at 3. Table 1 on the fourth page lists 50 “Investorowned Carbon Majors” and their cumulative global emissions 1751–2010. Id.
85

See ACCOUNTING FOR CARBON MAJORS, supra note 83, at 24; see also Philippines Climate
Petition, supra note 75, at 13.
86

87

Philippines Climate Petition, supra note 75, at 5.

Id. “A recent peer-reviewed article concluded that ‘major investor-owned fossil energy companies
carry significant responsibility for climate change.’” Id. at n.11; see also Peter C. Frumhoff, Richard
Heede & Naomi Oreskes, The Climate Responsibilities of Industrial Carbon Producers, 132
CLIMATIC CHANGE 157, 157–71 (2015), http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-015-14725.
88
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rights implications of climate change and ocean acidification and the resulting
rights violations in the Philippines, and whether the investor-owned Carbon
Majors have breached their responsibilities to respect the rights of the Filipino
people.”89
The specific violations, or threats of violations, of Filipino human rights
are identified in the Petition as the rights:
(a) to life; (b) to the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health; (c) to food; (d) to water; (e) to sanitation; (f) to
adequate housing; (g) to self-determination; and (h) of those
particularly likely to be affected by climate change, including
(1) women; (2) children; (3) persons with disabilities; (4) those
living in extreme poverty; (5) indigenous peoples; (6) displaced
persons; and (7) workers; as well as the right of Filipinos to
development.90
The Petition describes the key issue facing the Commission as “whether or
not the Respondent Carbon Majors must be held accountable . . . for the human
rights implications of climate change and ocean acidification.”91 Seven sets of
arguments are then presented in support of the petitioners’ request, which will
be analyzed below.
In addition to the overarching prayer for relief requesting the Commission
conduct an investigation into the responsibility of the investor-owned Carbon
Majors, the Petition requests the Commission “monitor” those within the
Philippines who are acutely vulnerable to climate change impacts.92 Another
prayer for relief requests the Commission make recommendations to
policymakers and legislators to develop and implement corporate reporting on
human rights issues, which link climate change impacts with GHG emissions
from fossil fuel production.93 Additionally, the Petition asks that,
“policymakers and legislators develop and adopt effective accountability
mechanisms that victims of climate change can easily access in instances of
violation or threat of violation.”94 A further prayer for relief is directed at the
Carbon Majors themselves, seeking that the Commission notify them and
“request the submission of plans on how such violations or threats of violations
resulting from the impacts of climate change will be eliminated and remedied
and prevented in the future.”95 Finally, attention is directed toward other

89

Philippines Climate Petition, supra note 75, at 31.

90

Id. at 5–6.

91

Id. at 17.

92

Id. at 31.

93

Id.

94

Philippines Climate Petition, supra note 75, at 31.

95

Id.
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States where “investor-owned Carbon Majors are incorporated,” asking the
Commission to call upon them “to take steps to prevent, remedy, or eliminate
human rights violations or threats of violations resulting from the impacts of
climate change, or seek a remedy before international mechanisms.”96
The Philippines Climate Petition is still in its early stages, and the first
hurdle for it to overcome is one relating to its jurisdiction (to hear the claims
brought before it). In July 2016, the Human Rights Commission of the
Philippines sent the Petition to the forty-seven investor-owned Carbon Majors
and ordered them to respond to the allegations.97 More than a dozen have
responded so far, and the petitioners are asking the Commission to hold public
hearings in early-to-mid 2017.98 The Commission will hear a number of issues
at this hearing, including a jurisdictional challenge that specifically argues the
nature of the investigation would require the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in violation of international law.99
IV.

ANALYSIS: CLIMATE JUSTICE, FEMINISM, & INTERNATIONAL LAW

This Part will examine three issues that arise in the Philippines Climate
Petition. The analysis will draw explicitly upon insights from Karen Knop’s
Re/Statements in order to demonstrate how feminist approaches to
international legal theory might enrich the understanding of fundamental
legal doctrines that are central to the outcome of the Petition. The issues
include: (1) the jurisdictional scope of the state duty to protect human rights;
(2) the relationship between international law and domestic law; and (3) the
96

Id.

See generally Press Release, Greenpeace Philippines, World’s Largest Carbon Producers Ordered
to Respond to Allegations of Human Rights Abuses from Climate Change (July 27, 2016),
http://www.greenpeace.org/seasia/ph/press/releases/Worlds-largest-carbon-producers-ordered-torespond-to-allegations-of-human-rights--abuses-from-climate-change/.
97

Press Release, Greenpeace Philippines, The Climate Change and Human Rights Petition, (July
28, 2016), http://www.greenpeace.org/seasia/ph/press/releases/Worlds-largest-carbon-producersordered-to-respond-to-allegations-of-human-rights--abuses-from-climate-change/The-ClimateChange-and-Human-Rights-Petition/. This press release includes “Corporate Responses and
comments on the petition” and “Petitioners’ Consolidated Reply.” Id.
98

For a summary of these responses, see Megan Darby, Carbon Majors Respond to Climate and
Human
Rights
Inquiry,
CLIMATE
HOME
(Oct.
27,
2016,
5:26
PM),
http://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/10/27/carbon-majors-respond-to-climate-and-humanrights-inquiry/; see also Fossil Fuel Firms Respond to Petition Before Philippines Human Rights
Commission on Human Rights & Climate Impacts, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR.,
https://business-humanrights.org/en/fossil-fuel-cos-respond-to-petition-with-philippines-humanrights-commission-on-human-rights-climate-change-impacts (last visited Feb. 20, 2017); Ping
Manongdo, Landmark Human Rights Case Against World’s Biggest Fossil Fuel Firms Pushes On,
ECO-BUS. (Dec. 13, 2016), http://www.eco-business.com/news/landmark-human-rights-caseagainst-worlds-biggest-fossil-fuel-firms-pushes-on/; Press Release, Greenpeace Philippines, First
National Human Rights Investigation Into Climate Change Impacts Proceeds Despite Opposition
from
Fossil
Fuel
Companies
(Dec.
8,
2016),
http://www.greenpeace.org/seasia/ph/press/releases/First-national-human-rights-investigationinto-climate-change-impacts-proceeds-despite-opposition-from-fossil-fuel-companies/.
99
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subjects of international law and the practice of sovereignty. The analysis of
each issue will consider one of three different claims arising from versions of a
critique of the bounded, autonomous, and unified liberal subject that informs
assumptions about the nature of the state and state sovereignty in
international law: (1) the relational state; (2) the false boundaries of public and
private; and (3) the reality of overlapping and interdependent sovereignties.
The Jurisdictional Scope of the State Duty to Protect and the Relational
State
The Philippines Climate Petition raises novel questions about prevention,
responsibility, and accountability for climate change harms framed as
violations of human rights. The first issue addressed in the Petition is the
jurisdiction of the Commission to hear the claim before it.100 The petitioners
rely upon the Commission’s rules of procedure, which provide for jurisdiction
to investigate and monitor violations of human rights and compliance by the
government of the Philippines.101 The petitioners then highlight United
Nations Human Rights Council (“UNHCR”) sources that clarify the
implications of climate change for human rights.102 Central to the arguments
in the Climate Change Petition are the 2011 United Nations Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights (“Guiding Principles”), a polycentric
governance framework developed through extensive multi-stakeholder
processes and unanimously endorsed by the UNHCR.103
The Guiding Principles are comprised of three interdependent pillars that
create a “dynamic system of preventative and remedial measures.”104 The
petitioners chose to squarely place their claims within the jurisdiction of the
Commission due, in part, to foundational Principle 2 of the Guiding Principles:
“[s]tates should set out clearly the expectation that all business enterprises
domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction respect human rights
throughout their operations.”105 The Petition then explores the Maastricht
Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic,
100

Philippines Climate Petition, supra note 75, at 5–11.

Id. at 6–7. See Annex A for a list of human rights treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory
or party. Id.
101

102

Id. at 7.

John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General), Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/AHRC-17-31_AEV.pdf [hereinafter UNGPs]; see also Sara L. Seck, Canadian Mining
Internationally and the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights, 49 CAN. Y.B. INT’L
L. 51, 94–113 (2011).
103

UNGPs, supra note 103, ¶ 6 (stating the three pillars include: the State’s duty to protect human
rights against abuses by business enterprises, “the corporate responsibility to respect human
rights,” and the need for effective remedies for victims of human rights abuses).
104

105

Id. at 7.
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Social, and Cultural Rights, which the petitioners argue “provide guidance and
legal grounds” to support the obligations of States at international law to
“respect, protect and fulfill human rights abroad,” while also having
obligations within their own territories.106 However, the petitioners fail to
make any reference to Principle 1 of the Guiding Principles, which is arguably
much more relevant to the harms at issue. According to Principle 1, “[s]tates
must protect against human rights abuse within their territory and/or
jurisdiction by third parties, including business enterprises. This requires
taking appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress such abuse
through effective policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication (emphasis
added).”107 Similarly, the petitioners do not mention Principle 25 of the
Guiding Principles, which states: “[a]s part of their duty to protect against
business-related human rights abuse, States must take appropriate steps to
ensure, through judicial, administrative, legislative or other appropriate
means, that when such abuses occur within their territory and/or jurisdiction
those affected have access to effective remedy.”108 National human rights
mechanisms, like the Philippine Commission, are specifically contemplated in
the Commentary to Principle 25.109 Furthermore, according to Principle 26:
“[s]tates should take appropriate steps to ensure the effectiveness of domestic
judicial mechanisms when addressing business-related human rights abuses,
including considering ways to reduce legal, practical and other relevant
barriers that could lead to a denial of access to remedy.”110 Among the barriers
that can prevent legitimate redress identified in the Commentary to Principle
26 is “[t]he way in which legal responsibility is attributed among members of
a corporate group under domestic criminal and civil law facilitates the
avoidance of appropriate accountability.”111
As argued in the Petition and described in the previous section, the climate
harms at issue were experienced by Filipinos in the Philippines or will be
experienced there in the future. Accordingly, it is conceptually accurate to say
the abuses occur or occurred within the territory of the Philippines. The
petitioners requested an investigation of the identified investor-owned Carbon
Majors, many of whom do business in the Philippines, whether directly or
through affiliates or other business relationships. The Guiding Principles

Id. at 6; see also EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS CONSORTIUM, MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES ON
EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS OF STATES IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS 6 (Jan. 2013), http://www.etoconsortium.org/nc/en/main-navigation/library/maastrichtprinciples/?tx_drblob_pi1%5BdownloadUid%5D=23 [hereinafter MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES].
106

UNGPs, supra note 103, at 6–7 (emphasis added); see also Letter from Sara L. Seck, Associate
Professor, Western University, to Commissioners, Commission on the Human Rights of the
Philippines
(Nov.
12,
2016),
https://businesshumanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Western%20University.pdf.
107

108

UNGPs, supra note 103, at 22.

109

See id. at 22–23.

110

Id. at 23.

111

Id.
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contemplate the importance of access to remedies and the important role state
human rights commissions must play in the quest for them, irrespective of the
corporate form of the business enterprise. While the physical locations from
which the Carbon Majors emit, and have previously emitted, greenhouse gases
are not within the territory of the Philippines, this is arguably irrelevant to
the jurisdictional question. The harm and therefore abuse has been, and will
be, experienced in the Philippines. Therefore the Commission of Human Rights
of the Philippines must have jurisdiction to consider the request for an
investigation. Yet, curiously, the petitioners felt it necessary to suggest that
the exercise of jurisdiction on the facts would be extraterritorial and that,
despite this, it was not only justified but mandated, due to the existence of
extraterritorial state obligations.
Notably, the sixth argument expounded by the petitioners raises the issue
of the responsibility of the States in which the Carbon Majors are incorporated.
Here, the petitioners claim that these States “have obligations to protect the
human rights of Filipinos, including the duty to prevent harm by third parties,
and the Philippines has a duty to assess, monitor, and notify of current or
threatened harm.”112 The Petition relies upon the customary international law
principle “do no harm,” codified in the Stockholm and Rio Declarations.113 The
Petition also relies on the International Law Commission Draft Articles on the
Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, in conjunction
with States’ duties, which are argued to extend extraterritorially under
international human rights law.114 The Petition also refers to the 2013
Mapping Report of State Obligations for Environmental Rights that was
prepared by the Independent Expert on Human Rights and Environment and
included the duty to regulate private actors to protect against environmental
harms.115
It is important to distinguish the permissive exercise of jurisdiction by a
State under general rules of public international law from an obligation to
exercise jurisdiction under the primary rules of international human rights or
112

Philippines Climate Petition, supra note 75, at 25–28.

Id. at 26, citing U. N. Conference on the Human Environment, Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, princ. 21, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.48/Rev.1 (June 16, 1972);
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, princ. 2, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (June 14, 1992).
113

See GAOR, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (Aug. 12, 1992); see also Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on
Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activites, with Commentaries, Rep. on the
Work of its fifty-third session, U.N. Doc A/56/10 (2001), cited in Philippines Climate Petition, supra
note 75, at 25–27. For ETOs, reliance is placed on the Maastricht Principles, cited in Philippines
Climate Petition, supra note 75, at 9–10, 27.
114

Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 12, at 7, para. 17 (cited in Philippines Climate
Petition, supra note 75, at 27–28 n.110); see also U.N. GAOR, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on
the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and
Sustainable Environment: Climate Change, at para. 14, U.N. Doc A/HRC/31/52 (2016).
115
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environmental law. As part of the State’s duty to protect the rights of Filipinos,
the Commission is clearly permitted to exercise jurisdiction over this request
for an investigation into harms linked to the products of the investor-owned
Carbon Majors, even if the existence of an obligation to do so may be contested.
The Commission may need to seek cooperation from the States in which the
head offices of some investor-owned Carbon Majors are physically located, or
where the parent company of a Carbon Major enterprise is incorporated, in
order to effectively complete an investigation. However, this is no different
from any other multi-jurisdictional investigation, a common occurrence in an
economically interconnected world. International law is clear that there is a
permissive rule with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction in similar cases, with
concern arising only in the cases of conflicting, not concurrent, jurisdiction.116
While other States may choose to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the
investor-owned Carbon Majors, absent another State legislating to block the
investigation of the Philippines Human Rights Commission, there is no
conflict. Moreover, any such action would likely violate the duty to cooperate
that is essential to addressing the climate change problem, if not a violation of
the harm principle itself.117
Beyond the Guiding Principles, U.S. courts have applied the federal
comprehensive environmental clean up statute to emissions from a smelter
located in Canada. The emissions flowed across the border from Canada into
the United States, causing harm within the United States.118 Initially,
petitioners challenged the action as an extraterritorial application of the
statute; on appeal, the U.S. Circuit Court concluded that it was better
understood as a domestic application of the statute.119 Although this case may
be seen as an isolated example, its significance lies in the fact that the smelter
at issue is the same as that of the 1930s Trail Smelter arbitration, which is
often credited with contributing to the customary legal status of the “do no

Sara L. Seck, Home State Responsibility and Local Communities: The Case of Global Mining,
11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 177, 192–96 (2008) (discussing jurisdictional conflicts); see also
Sara L. Seck, Conceptualizing the Home State Duty to Protect Human Rights, in CORPORATE
SOCIAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS RESPONSIBILITIES: GLOBAL, LEGAL AND MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES
25 (Karin Buhmann et. al eds., 2011).
116

See Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 12, at paras. 42–46; Philippines Climate
Petition, supra note 75, at 27–28. The Petition requests the Philippines to notify Carbon Majors
States of their duty to protect Filipinos human rights as well as cooperating with the Commission
investigation. Id.
117

Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). The Colville Tribes
petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency requesting a study and clean up of the
contaminated area in which they live. Id.
118

The case turned on statutory interpretation, with the interpretation informed by the fact that
the legislation was designed to address remediation of harm, such as clean up of pollution, which
is physically located in the United States. Id.
119
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harm” principle of international environmental law.120 The exercise of
jurisdiction by the Philippines Commission on Human Rights over the Carbon
Majors is arguably no different from the exercise of jurisdiction by the United
States over emissions from Canada’s Trail Smelter.
If the analysis above is correct, as I believe it to be, then why did the
petitioners feel it necessary to raise and counter the extraterritoriality
concern? The facts of this Petition are clearly distinguishable from those at
play in the infamous Kiobel case in the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court in
Kiobel concluded the presumption against extraterritoriality applied to the
Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), thus severely constraining the potential to invoke
the ATS in transnational corporate accountability litigation before U.S. federal
courts.121 The answer to this question becomes clear if attention is paid to
Karen Knop’s critique in Re/Statements of the State as a bounded, unified self.
Knop observes that international law following the Grotian tradition has
conceived of sovereignty like property, with private property rules influencing
the development of international law on the acquisition of territorial
sovereignty.122 She suggests that there are two ways of understanding the
relationship between States and individuals: “[o]ne is an analogy (States are
like individuals) and the other a theory about the ultimate bearer of rights
(States are composed of individuals).”123 According to Knop, treating States
like individuals “projects a certain view about human nature onto the nature
of the State,” yet substituting other assumptions will not alter the analogy.124
For Knop, the analogy is ultimately limited because, unlike individuals, States
“are not unified beings, they are not irreducible units of analysis.”125 On the
other hand, “if the State is viewed as composed of individuals” (and groups)
this difficulty does not exist.126
Knop observes that the autonomous (male) individual of liberal thought
tends to underlie the analogy that States are like individuals.127 Some scholars
See, e.g., MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 618–19 (7th ed. 2014) (quoting Arbitral Trib.,
3 U.N. Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941) (“[N]o state has the right to use or permit the use of
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the
properties or persons therein . . . ”)).
120

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013); see also Sara L. Seck, Kiobel and
the E-word: Reflections on Transnational Environmental Responsibility in an Interconnected
World, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (July 5, 2015), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2013/07/saraseck-on-kiobel-and-e-word.html.
121

122

Knop, supra note 8, at 318–19.

123

Id. at 319–20.

124

Id. at 320.

125

Id.

126

Id.

Knop, supra note 8, at 321. See discussion, infra notes 47–58, of the autonomous subject of
liberal thought.
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of feminist international legal theory, however, “see the self as connected to
others through a web of relationships, instead of as separate and surrounded
by solid boundaries that protect its autonomy.”128 This leads to the conclusion
that, “conceptually, the solid boundaries around the State” should “be replaced
with permeable boundaries” or “removed altogether.”129 However, according to
Knop, feminist approaches proceed “from two distinct versions of the
analogy.”130 She describes these as the “body theory” (where a State’s territory
is analogous to a person’s body and so the “State rules within the territory”)
and the “property theory” (where a State’s territory is its property, and what
is done on State territory cannot be controlled by international law).131
Knop postulates that feminists begin with the body theory when analyzing
the “norms governing relations between States.”132 Feminists see the embodied
individual through “theories of connectedness” or the “feminist ethic of care,”
which provide explanatory, and possibly prescriptive power, for the “nature of
relationships between States” in international environmental law.133 For
example, notions of “global or environmental stewardship,” in international
law, embody a “feminist morality” that “embraces a notion of caretaking and
accountability, presumably to ourselves and future generations.”134 These
claims may be viewed as a critique of the “bounded State/self,” implying that
“fixed, rigid boundaries between States fail — both conceptually and physically
. . . to reflect patterns of interaction and responsibility, or worse, prevent the
formation of patterns that are seen as desirable.”135
To reiterate, this Article asks why the petitioners felt it necessary to
counter the claim that the Petition might involve an illicit exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Knop suggests that international legal theorists,
including feminists, tend to conceptualize sovereign States as analogous to the
128

Id.

129

Id.

130

Id. at 322.

Id. (noting that Lauterpacht distinguished between a “space” theory and an “object” theory that
are similar).
131

132

Knop, supra note 8, at 323.

Id. The theories, in part, are based upon the work of Moira McConnell and Isabelle Gunning.
See generally Gunning, supra note 69; Dr. M.L. McConnell, The Relationship Between Theories
About Women and Theories about International Law, in STATE SOVEREIGNTY: THE CHALLENGE OF
A CHANGING WORLD: “NEW APPROACHES AND THINKING ON INTERNATIONAL LAW” 68 (1992).
133

Knop, supra note 8 at 324 (citing Moira L. McConnell, Making Sense: International Law and
its Developing Ethos of Care: The Sound of One Hand Clapping 27 (Oct. 1991) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with Knop)).
134

Knop, supra note 8, at 325. However, Knop observes that while these conclusions flow when
drawing upon the work of cultural feminists, a different result emerges when the contributions of
radical feminists who dread, rather than value, the dissolution of boundaries. See id. at 325–27.
Knop notes, however, that an alternate view, found in French feminists’ writings, might draw
attention to the “contact and interaction that occurs at every point on a boundary.” Id. at 327–28.
135
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autonomous individual—a bounded, unified self—although the version of the
analogy alternates between the body and property theories.136 Both theories
reinforce a bounded model of sovereignty, a model that is further reinforced by
bright-line distinctions between territorial and extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Knop suggests that international lawyers who invoke a feminist ethic of care
and notions of global environmental stewardship provide a credible critique of
the bounded model of the State. Accordingly, scholars, activists, and even the
petitioners themselves should avoid language that reinforces the
territorial/extraterritorial divide when arguing in favor of state duties and the
exercise of state jurisdiction in cases like the Philippines Climate Petition.
Adopting a relational approach to state sovereignty could help to form and
reinforce countervailing patterns of interdependence and duties of cooperation
essential to addressing the challenges of climate change.
International and Domestic Law and the False Boundaries of the
Public/Private Divide
Two seemingly distinct issues will be addressed in this section with
reference to Knop’s analysis in Re/Statements. First, as described earlier, the
petitioners chose to focus on the “investor-owned” Carbon Majors in their
request for an investigation.137 Non-investor-owned Carbon Majors, which are
significant contributors to greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions, were left out of
the Petition, including both State-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) and NationStates. 138 This is curious because international law imposes on SOEs an
enhanced, rather than diminished, responsibility to respect human rights.139
Moreover, Nation-States not only have a responsibility to respect rights but
also duties to protect, respect, ensure, and fulfill human rights.140 The
petitioners likely omitted claims against Nation-States (direct emitters) and
SOEs (agents of the State) because well-established doctrines of sovereign
immunity may have prevented the Philippine Commission from investigating
these actors.141 This distinction between private actors (investor-owned) and
public actors (State-owned, or the State itself) may be said to reflect an

Id. at 342. This analysis may gain further insights from the work of Dayna Nadine Scott on the
eco-feminist theory of “transcorporeality.” See generally Dayna N. Scott, ‘We are the Monitors Now’:
Experiential Knowledge, Transcorporeality and Environmental Justice, 25:3 SOC. & LEGAL STUD.
261 (2016).
136

137

Philippines Climate Petition, supra note 75, at 31.

138

ACCOUNTING FOR CARBON MAJORS, supra note 83, at 25–32.

State-owned Enterprises Must Lead by Example on Business and Human Rights – New UN
Report,
U.N.
HUM.
RTS.
(June
17,
2016),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20123&LangID=E.
139

140

UNGPs, supra note 103, at paras. 6–7.

See SHAW, supra note 120, at 519–27, for more information on sovereign immunity for violations
of human rights and the commercial activity exception.
141
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assumed boundary between public and private that feminist scholars,
including Knop, critique.
Second, the Petition highlights in several places that Philippine law must
be informed by international law. This is either because the Philippines has
signed or ratified international human rights treaties142 or because, as
presented in the Petition’s seventh argument, the constitution of the
Philippines adopts “generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land.”143 These principles apply particularly in environmental
cases “whether or not they have been transposed into local laws.”144 The
petitioners highlight the importance of this issue due to the transboundary
nature of many environmental problems, including climate change, and the
traditional limitation of domestic laws, which regulate to address problems
“within national boundaries.”145 Among the general principles of importance to
the case are those raised in the petitioners’ fifth argument where they argue
that scientific uncertainty in establishing the responsibility of respondents for
“specific or future human rights harms” should not be an impediment, as the
precautionary principle would apply.146 This claim is supported by existing
international law on environmental impact assessment as described in the
2015 Oslo Principles on Global Obligations to Reduce Climate Change (“Oslo
Principles”).147 According to the Oslo Principles, there is “clear and convincing
evidence” that human-produced GHGs cause “significant changes to the
climate”148 and the precautionary principle requires these emissions “be
reduced to the extent, and at a pace, necessary to protect against the threats
of climate change that can still be avoided.”149 The Oslo Principles also provide
that GHG reductions must be determined by “credible and realistic worst-case
scenario[s] accepted by a substantial number of eminent climate change
experts.”150
The relationship between domestic and international law is central to both
jurisdictional and substantive arguments made by the petitioners. In
Re/Statements, Knop examines how feminist international law scholars

142

Philippines Climate Petition, supra note 75, at 7.

143

Id. at 28 (citing CONST. (1987), art. III, § 2 (Phil.)).

144

Id. at 29 (internal citation omitted).

145

Id.

146

Philippines Climate Petition, supra note 75, at 23–24 (internal citation omitted).

ANTONIO BENJAMIN ET AL., OSLO PRINCIPLES ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE OBLIGATIONS, GLOB.
JUST. PROGRAM, http://globaljustice.macmillan.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/OsloPrinciples.pdf
(last visited Mar. 15, 2017) [hereinafter OSLO PRINCIPLES] (reporting the beliefs of various experts
147

on how Climate Change affects international human rights).
148

Id. at 3.
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Id.
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Id.
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understand the boundary line “between international and domestic
jurisdiction.”151 Feminist critiques of the “boundary between public and
private” are applied to the “boundary between international and domestic
jurisdiction,” with many feminist scholars concluding that in some cases
boundaries should be eliminated while in others cases boundaries that are
rigid “should become permeable.”152 Knop suggests the boundary metaphor
being critiqued here is that of the propertied individual, either “in the concrete
sense of owning private property or in the abstract sense of limits or fences
around the individual’s private domain or family.”153
Essentially, feminist scholars claim “[i]nternational law regulates
relations between States, which take place in the public sphere, whereas a
State’s treatment of its nationals occurs in the State’s private sphere, away
from the scrutiny of international law.”154 While international human rights
law “has shifted the boundary between public and private—international and
domestic jurisdiction—it has not called into question the concept of the
boundary.”155 Knop observes, however, that there is “tension between
particularism and universalism” for “[i]f women’s security interest in the
sovereign State supports rigid boundaries between States/bodies, it supports
equally the removal of the boundary between international jurisdiction/public
and domestic jurisdiction/private in situations of armed conflict.”156 She
concludes by noting that, while feminist scholarship in international law has
criticized the “premise of the State as bounded,” it has accepted the “premise
of the State as [being] unified.”157 The result has been to “project onto State
sovereignty” the “powerful, yet ambivalent, feminist rejection of liberalism.”158
Application of Knop’s analysis to the petitioners’ arguments leads to the
following conclusions. First, it could be that a feminist approach to
international law questions the boundaries between what is public and private.
However, unlike the usual feminist concern that issues falling within the
private sphere are beyond the scope of international law, the Petition faces the
opposite problem: the GHG emissions from SOEs and Nation-States are

151

Knop, supra note 8, at 329.

152

Id.

153

Id.

154

Id. at 330.

155

Id.

Knop, supra note 8, at 331 (highlighting Knop’s point that it is important for feminists to
question the assumed boundary between domestic and international law, while drawing upon an
example from a different international law context). See generally Judith G. Gardam, The Law of
Armed Conflict: A Feminist Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A
GLOBAL CHALLENGE (Kathleen E. Mahoney and Paul Mahoney eds., 1993).
156

157

Knop, supra note 8, at 332.

Id. Knop continues: this rejection is “the simultaneous demand for respect of women’s selfhood,
and rejection of much of the language and many of the assumptions of individual rights that have
been the primary means of expressing and enforcing respect for selfhood.” Id.
158
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insulated from investigation by the Philippine Human Rights Commission.
Ultimately, Knop queries whether the concept of a boundary between public
and private is useful from a feminist perspective because the concept is
associated with a conceptualization of the State as a unified self—which it is
not. This suggests the petitioners should have included both private and public
(investor-owned and State-owned) Carbon Majors in the Petition, despite
possible sovereign immunity concerns. This would be more consistent with the
requests for relief directed toward the States in which the investor-owned
Carbon Majors are incorporated. Second, to the extent the boundary between
public and private informs the boundary between domestic and international
law, either eliminating or rendering permeable the boundary would support
the petitioners’ claim that the Commission should take sources of international
law seriously in its assessment of both its jurisdiction and the substance of the
claims.
The Subjects of International Law and the Practice of Overlapping,
Interdependent Sovereignties
A final key issue that may confront the Commission in the future is the
claim that business enterprises do not have direct obligations under
international human rights law.159 The Petition relies heavily upon the 2011
U.N. Guiding Principles to claim that the corporate responsibility to respect
rights reflects current “norms and standards on the responsibility of corporate
actors.”160 Consequently, all businesses have a responsibility not only to
comply with national laws and regulations that incorporate international
human rights standards, but also to comply with “a global standard of expected
conduct” that “exists over and above” legal compliance and “independently of
an enterprise’s own commitments for human rights.”161 Furthermore, the
application of this framework to environmental rights is contemplated by
As of the time of writing this Article, the responses submitted by investor-owned Carbon Majors
have tended to claim the Commission has neither subject matter jurisdiction nor personal
jurisdiction, and that the claim does not raise a recognizable cause of action. The specific question
posed in this section does not appear to have arisen in the responses submitted to date. See
generally The Climate and Human Rights Petition, GREENPEACE (July 28, 2016),
http://www.greenpeace.org/seasia/ph/press/releases/Worlds-largest-carbon-producers-ordered-torespond-to-allegations-of-human-rights--abuses-from-climate-change/The-Climate-Change-andHuman-Rights-Petition/; Darby, supra note 99; Fossil Fuel Firms Respond to Petition Before
Philippines Human Rights Commission on Human Rights and Climate Impacts, supra note 99;
Manongdo, supra note 99; Press Release, Greenpeace Philippines, supra note 99. However, this is
a long-standing debate in the business and international human rights law literature, and so
merits attention here. See generally Justine Nolan, The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human
Rights: Soft Law Or Not Law?, in HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS: BEYOND THE
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT? 138, 138–61 (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 2013).
159

160

Philippines Climate Petition, supra note 75, at 17.

U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, The Corporate Responsibility to Respect
Human
Rights:
An
Interpretive
Guide,
13–14
(June
2012),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HR.PUB.12.2_En.pdf [hereinafter Interpretive
Guide].
161

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3284871

26

TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 26:XXX

Philippine constitutional law as well as rules applicable to environmental
cases.162
The Petition relies upon Principle 13 of the Guiding Principles to argue
that “investor-owned Carbon Majors [are in breach of] their responsibilities to
respect the rights of Filipino people and communities.”163 This breach arises
from “directly or indirectly contributing to current or future adverse human
rights impacts through the extraction and sale of fossil fuels and activities
undermining climate action.”164 According to the petitioners, the companies’
accumulated GHG emissions “have contributed to a consistently elevated level
of atmospheric carbon dioxide” which has “result[ed] in a multitude of climate
change impacts.”165 Applying Principle 13 to the facts, the petitioners note that
“a company can be responsible for adverse impacts on human rights” when it
either causes or contributes to these human rights impacts “through its own
activities,” or when it is “involved in impacts caused by an entity that is directly
linked to its business operations, products, or services.”166
In the third argument, the petitioners rely upon the Guiding Principles to
claim the Carbon Majors have also breached their responsibilities “by failing
to prevent human rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations,
products, or services by [their] business relationships.”167 According to
Principle 17, businesses should carry out “human rights due diligence” “in
order to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their
adverse human rights impacts.”168 The “process [of due diligence] should be ongoing and involve meaningful consultation . . . with relevant stakeholders.”169
Whatever else may be said, the petitioners claim the conduct of Carbon Majors,
which involves “making long-term investments based on a scenario in which
global consumption of fossil fuels continues to grow, thus warming the earth
to levels that will lead to dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system,” is clearly inconsistent with a requirement of human rights
due diligence.170 Moreover, the Carbon Majors’ conduct ignores “the science
and the harms” arising from their products.171
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Philippines Climate Petition, supra note 75, at 18–19.

163

Id. at 19; see also UNGPs, supra note 103, at 14.
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Philippines Climate Petition, supra note 75, at 19; see also UNGPs, supra note 103, at 14.
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Philippines Climate Petition, supra note 75, at 19–20.
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Id. at 19; see also Interpretive Guide, supra note 161, at 15.
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Philippines Climate Petition, supra note 75, at 21.
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UNGPs, supra note 103, at 16.
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Philippines Climate Petition, supra note 75, at 22; see also UNGPs, supra note 103, at 16–18.
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Philippines Climate Petition, supra note 75, at 22.
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Id. at 22.
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Finally, the petitioners argue that due to the Carbon Majors study, it is
now “feasible to assign responsibility” both “collectively and individually for
human rights impacts resulting from climate change and ocean
acidification.”172 Again relying upon the Guiding Principles, the petitioners
argue, “responsibility is not contingent on a company being the sole cause of a
human rights impact.”173 Instead, a company “is responsible if it has
contributed to or is involved in the impacts, even if it is one among many
responsible parties.”174 As the Carbon Majors contribute to climate change
collectively through indistinguishable emissions, the Petition argues “there is
a substantial probability that the climate impacts experienced by Filipinos are
made significantly worse as a result of the Carbon Majors’ past and current
activities.”175
An analysis of whether or not businesses have direct obligations under
international law, as conceptualized in the Guiding Principles and the
implications of this finding for the work of the Commission, can be informed
by Knop’s Re/Statements in several ways.176 First, flowing from the discussion
above, to the extent the Guiding Principles reflect international soft law and
the argument that the boundary between international and domestic law
should be dissolved, then the Guiding Principles must be understood to form
part of the applicable law to be considered by the Commission.177 Second, Knop
ultimately rejects the analogy between the individual and the State and
considers the need to break down the State, for “whatever the analogic
conventions of international law, the State is not a unified self.”178 If this is so,
then non-state actors, including businesses, become worthy of consideration as
actors in their own right at international law.
According to Knop, while international human rights law provides a
“limited notion of minority rights within the State,” “‘minorities’ are claiming
the right of self-determination” which is increasingly “being reinterpreted as
something less than full sovereignty.”179 She observes, “demands for
sovereignty may involve territorially-based sovereignty within the State, or
non-territorially-based sovereignty in the sense of control over certain
essential aspects of the group’s collective identity or well-being.”180 While the
dilemma of the past was “who should practice sovereignty,” according to Knop,
172

Id. at 22.
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Id. at 23.
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Id.

175

Philippines Climate Petition, supra note 75, at 23.
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“[t]he more recent quandary, however, is what sovereignty should be.
Regardless of whether sovereignty ultimately resides in the government or the
people, why should there be a single sovereign order coterminous with the
State? Why not have overlapping sovereignties, fragmented sovereignties,
layered sovereignties?”181
Knop explores both “well-established, policy-oriented or functionalist
approaches” to the question of what sovereignty should be and “several newer,
still tentative, normative approaches.”182 Her aim is to provide feminist
theorists with insights into how to reconceive sovereignty so as to explore “how
women might participate in international law-making” as individuals as well
as “through their membership in different, potentially overlapping groups.”183
While Knop focuses on women and international law making, it is important
to observe that this conceptualization equally applies to other transnationally
connected groups, including transnational corporate enterprises.184
Ultimately, she considers normative approaches to sovereignty, including the
claim by feminist Jean Bethke Eishtain that “the sharply bounded, unified
sovereign State/self should be replaced by the ‘co-existence of overlapping,
porous sovereignties,’ with communities and groups—as well as sovereign
selves—having rights, and mediating institutions having more power than in
statist constructions.”185 As an example, Knop notes the frustration of
indigenous peoples who, denied “collective forms of representation in the
international legal system,” are increasingly “demanding recognition as
subjects of international law so that they can represent their own interests
directly in international fora.”186 For the purpose of the analysis here, this
recognition of non-state actor collective representation and rights should
equally extend to recognize non-state actor responsibilities. Indeed, acceptance
of the reality of overlapping sovereignties aligns perfectly with the polycentric
governance structure of the Guiding Principles according to which the business
responsibility to respect rights is independent of the state duty to protect and
exists over and above host state law.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

The Philippines Climate Petition is both unique and not unique. It is
unique in seeking to draw attention to climate justice through a domestic
human rights commission and in choosing to rest its claims largely on the U.N.
181
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Id. at 334.

183

Knop, supra note 8, at 341.

See, e.g., Larry Cata Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State: The
Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board and the Global Governance Order, 18
IND. J. INT'L L. 751 (2011).
184

185

Knop, supra note 8, at 342.

186

Id. at 342–343.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3284871

Summer 2017]

CLIMATE JUSTICE, FEMINISM, AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY

29

Guiding Principles, and in particular, the business responsibility to respect
human rights. It is not unique in that Filipino petitioners face tremendous
hurdles that are common to victims of environmental rights violations globally,
regardless of whether they seek transnational corporate accountability in host
courts, home State courts, or in other judicial and non-judicial fora.187 This
Article seeks to draw attention to implicit assumptions underpinning
fundamental structural understandings of state sovereignty in international
law. These structural understandings inhibit accountability and justice for
those whose enjoyment of human rights is violated by climate change.
Crucially, these assumptions derive from a bounded and unified autonomous
model of state sovereignty that is critiqued by feminist and relational theorists.
As women of the global South are among the most vulnerable to climate
harms,188 adopting a gender perspective on international law and climate
change is important. Beyond this, as all people and all creatures that live on
planet earth are differentially vulnerable to climate change, this analysis
should be understood to reflect universal concerns as we are all, ultimately,
relational beings.
I have outlined Karen Knop’s observations in detail to better respond to a
theme of her 1993 article: that “emerging feminist approaches to international
law have not yet challenged the deep structures of international law.”189 First,
I queried why it was that petitioners felt it necessary to counteract claims the
Petition might be illicit due to extraterritorial dimensions of its jurisdictional
reach. The explanation lies in the fact that international legal theorists,
including feminists, tend to conceptualize the sovereign State as analogous to
the autonomous individual—a bounded, unified self. This analogy reinforces a
bounded model of sovereignty. This model is reflected in common bright line
distinctions between “territorial” and “extraterritorial” jurisdiction. A
relational model of sovereignty, on the other hand, would embrace
responsibilities across borders. Framing the Petition in a language that avoids
reinforcing the territorial/extraterritorial divide would be in keeping with this
relational approach to sovereignty and might help to form, and reinforce,
countervailing patterns of interdependence and duties of cooperation.
Second, the Petition depends upon dissolving the boundaries between
international and domestic law and between public and private law. Reliance
is placed upon international law doctrines and instruments, including the
Guiding Principles that must be understood as part of the applicable law.
Moreover, the Petition is narrowly framed, focusing only upon the
responsibility of investor-owned Carbon Majors and leaving the responsibility
See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INJUSTICE INCORPORATED: CORPORATE ABUSES AND THE
HUMAN
RIGHT
TO
REMEDY
(Mar.
7,
2014),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/POL30/001/2014/en/; see also Sara L. Seck, Transnational
Business and Environmental Harm: A TWAIL Analysis of Home State Obligations, 3(1) TRADE L.
& DEV. 164 (2011).
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of State-owned Carbon Majors and States themselves untouched. Drawing
upon Knop’s analysis, a feminist approach to international law would question
the boundaries between public and private that are reinforced in the
distinction between investor-owned (private) and State-owned, or the State
itself (public), suggesting that petitioners could or should have pushed for
wider coverage of the investigation. Moreover, a feminist approach would
question the boundaries between domestic and international law, suggesting
that petitioners were justified in relying on multiple sources of international
law to back their claims, including the Guiding Principles, as well as
international environmental law’s no harm and precautionary principles.
Indeed, it is then curious why the petitioners chose not to invoke another key
principle of international environmental law: the polluter pays principle.190
Moving beyond the idea of the State as a bounded, unified self creates the
possibility of taking seriously a central concern arising from the Petition:
whether business enterprises as non-State actors have direct obligations to
respect human rights at international law. Once it is accepted that the State
is not a bounded, unified self, Knop suggests we may turn our attention from
the question of who should be understood to practice sovereignty and shift
toward more nuanced questions of what sovereignty is or should be. If
individuals and others can participate in international law making, including
through memberships in “different, potentially overlapping groups,”191 then
claims that businesses have a direct responsibility to respect human rights
gain credence. This is especially so given the multi-stakeholder nature of the
process leading to State and non-State endorsements of the Guiding Principles.
The real question should perhaps be, do those whose human rights are violated
by climate change believe the Carbon Majors have such obligations?
Knop concludes, “[i]f the international system is ‘nothing other than a
structure of ideas,’ as Philip Allott has written, then it is at this level that the
system must be challenged—but with the abstract anchored in the concrete,
the real transformed by the imagination.”192 It remains to be seen how the
Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines will respond to the Petition
before it. This Article has explored how a feminist or relational approach to
international legal analysis might inform understandings of the legal
challenges that face the Commission. Given the gendered impacts of climate
change and the need to increase the participation of women in climate change
decision-making and policy, it is important to consider whether insights can be
gained from feminist scholarship on international law and used for the
Rio Declaration, supra note 113, princ. 16 (national authorities should endeavor to promote the
internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account
the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to
the public interest and without distorting international trade and investment); see also EJOLT,
MAPPING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: POLLUTER PAYS: http://www.ejolt.org/2013/05/polluter-paysprinciple/.
190
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analysis of climate justice and the accountability of the Carbon Majors. A full
assessment of transnational corporations, extractive industries, and the global
South demands no less.
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